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TOWARDS NEGOTIABILITY OF GOODS
BY JOHN MERLO
It has been uniformly held as a rule supported by
imposing precedent in the common-law field of Sales of
Goods that a buyer acquires no other or greater title
than the seller had, that, aside from statutes, posses-
sion alone does not give the possessor the right or
power to dispose of the goods to a third party to the
prejudice of the title of the true owner. I
But by all courts an exception is admitted to the
above rule to the effect that the owner of the goods may
clothe the possessor with apparent authority to sell or
apparent ownership, whereby third parties found to be
bona fide purchasers for value without notice from the
possessor will prevail over the original owner in any
action wherein such owner seeks to assert his title to
the goods. 2 The equitable maxim, "Where one of two in-
nocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he,
by whose negligence it happened, must be the sufferer,"
is sometimes used to reach the same results. 3  This
maxim, however, has often been criticized as vague and
impossible of precise applicaticn, serving, perhaps, as
a good restatement of what has been decided but as no
accurate basis for the decision. In all cases, however,
that have been correctly decided by application of the
above mentioned exceptions to the primary rule of pro-
perty mentioned above, something more than possession
is necessary in the intermediate party, as a bill of
sale signed by the original owner placed in the hands
of the possessor or words or acts of the owner which
would reasonably lead the third party to believe that
the possessor is either an authorized agent to sell or
the holder of the legal title, before the third party
is allowed to prevail over the real owner.
4
From a search of the primary authorities it ap-
pears, however, that another exception has been made to
the rule of property law that a buyer acquires no other
1 - Henderson Baker Lmbr. Co. v. Headley, 247 Ala. 681, 26 So. 2d 8 Metropolitan Fi-
nance Corp. of America v. Morf, 42 Cal. App. 2d 756, 109 P. 2d 969; Church v. Mell-
ville, 17 Or. 413, 21 P. 387; Moore v. Long, 33 So. 2d 6, 1947.
2 - Kearby v. Western States Securities Co. 31Ariz. 104, 250P. 766; Uniform Sales Act,
Section 23.
3 - Cal. Div. Code 3542; Conklin v. Benson, 159 Cal. 785, 116 P. 34.
4 - Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38, 1812 Nixon v. Brown, 57 N.H. 34, 1876 Pool v.
George, 209 S. W. 2d 209; see Vold, Cases on Sales, 1949 Ed. Pg. 466 nt. 14.
or greater title than the seller had. The Courts have
not put this exception, as yet, in the form of a rule,
nor have they in fact openly admitted that they were
treading in waters beyond apparent authority or owner-
ship, 5 yet from an analysis of the facts of recent de-
cisions of some courts-, it appears that the possessor
of goods with no indicia of ownership nor apparent
authority to sell who received the goods in pursuance
of a contract to sell has been given the power to in-
vest title of his transferrar in a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice of the rights of the original
party. 6
Perhaps the most common and clearest illustration
of an owner being deprived of his goods is the situa-
tion where he delivers to B who is in the business of
selling that and similar merchandise. A sale by B in
this case not in accordance with authority given or
even where no authority to sell is given would place
the title in the bona fide purchaser for value without
notice. The rule is well stated by Justice Field in
an obiter: "The delivery of goods to a merchant en-
gaged in the sale of articles of a similar kind, is
such evidence of bestowal of the right to dispose of
the same as to protect the purchaser from the posses-
sor. " 7' There is no question that under such facts
there is something more than possession in the inter-
mediate party that precludes the original owner from
the recovery of his goods or their value.
A closer case, however, is presented when the
intermediate party acts both in the capacity of seller
of his own goods and as bailee of g ods for others.
These cases usually do not involve delivery of posses-
sion in pursuance of a contract to sell, but do indi-
cate the extent of the rules of apparent authority or
apparent ownership. In Kastner v. Andrews,8 where the
farmerts grain was bailed to the elevator operator,
who was also in the business of selling his own grain,
a purchaser from the elevator operator with no actual
5 - See as an illustration of this point Blount v. Bainbridge, 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S.E.
2d 122, Apr. 1949.
6 - Close on the facts as to whether there was more than possession, see Jesse Meadows
v. Hampton Live Stock Conr. Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 634, 131 P. 591, 1942. Here the
original seller refused to give a bill of sale as required by the Ag. Code, wish-
ing to reserve title until he received cash. The bona fide purchaser from the
possessor prevailed.
7 - Wright v. Soloman, 19 Cal. 64.
8 - Kastner v. Andrews, 49 N.D. 1059, 194 N.W. 824, 1923.
knowledge of the specific transaction of bailment was
held liable in conversion to the bailor. It was held
that the purchaser could not rely upon apparent owner-
ship created by the act of the farmer, since as a grain
dealer he knew the manner in which the Elevator Co. did
business generally. A reverse holding was made in
Kearby v. Western States Securities Co., 9 where it was
contended that even if there were no authority to sell,
the Security Co. that allowed the automobile dealer to
display the car for sale purposes was bound by a sale
thereof to a good faith purchaser for value without
notice. Such cases may be distinguished, it seems, on
the score of knowledge, that which will serve as appar-
ent ownership for one being insufficient for another.
better informed.
And if a bill of sale signed by the owner accom-
panies the possession, although title was withheld, the
bona fide purchaser from the possessor prevails.10
Whether apparent ownership or authority to sell
exists, for practical purposes the same question whether
estoppel is present, may get still closer. In Keegan
v. Kaufman Bros. et. al. 1 lambs were bought from the
possessor for cash in good faith and without notice that
title was in other than the possessor. The original
vendor here reserved title until cash was received from
a check given by the possessor. The cash was not re-
ceived, nor was receipt of the same waived. The origin-
al vendor stood by as the sheep were loaded, the court
by that fact estopping him from asserting his title, in-
sisting that an "indicia of ownership" was created by
the seller standing by.
It seems the court might have been on sounder
footing if "indicia of ownership" were based on the fact
that sheep were delivered to one in the business of sel-
ling sheep. But to that reasoning the same rebuttal
might have been used as was used in Kastner v. Andrews,
supra. 12
To ascribe apparent authority or ownership to a
9 - Cited in Note 2.
10 - Dudley v. Lovins, 220 S. W. 2d 978.
11 - 68 Cal. App. 2d 197, 156 P. 2d 261, 1945. See also Meadows case cited in Note 6.
12 - Citation, Note 8. The Court said: "The purchaser likewise know$ the character of
the business transacted by the warehouseman (intermediate party) and knows that
in the ordinary conduct of such business he will both purchase . . . This carries
notice that his right to sell is limited . . . Hence no reason is apparent for
making an exception to the rule of "caveat emptor"."
transaction the original seller by word or act must mis-
lead the third party to his prejudice. There is no pos-
itive duty upon the original party. 13 The bona fide pur-
chaser here was not made to believe that the possessor
was owner by any act, admission or conduct of the origi-
nal owner; he depended upon his own knowledge of the
facts. It is said to be well settled that "standing by"
creates a good basis for estoppel, 14 yet the cases
examined do not reanalyze the situation with reference
to the theory of estoppel, but merely cite precedent and
authority for support.
Aside from apparent ownership would the California
case referred to in some detail above have been decided
the same? Perhaps an answer may be got from decisions
in other jurisdictions to follow. 15
A recent case that bombards the facts with various
legal theories in an attempt to protect the bona fide
purchaser from a possessor who received the goods by
virtue of a contract to sell is Sullivan Co. v. Larson,
a Nebraska decision. 16 The original sell.er sought to
replevy 28 head of cattle. Plaintiff sold them to B,
who gave a bad check; no title was to pass until cash
was received. Defendant bought the cattl.e at auction
conducted on behalf of B, and judgment went for the
defendant. The court, relying upon possession alone
as indication of ownership, allowed the bona fide pur-
chaser to prevail.
The court cites Parr v. Helfrich, 17 really no
authority for the present decision, for there a certi-
fied check was involved, the original transaction held
to be one where the title of the goods was meant to pass
for the certified check, it being considered the equiva-
lent of cash. The Uniform Sales Act, Section 23, was
cited, the court opining that plaintiff had allowed the
13 - Estoppel by silence, Black's Law Dict, wherein it is defined as: "A kind of equi-
table estoppel arising where a person under a duty to another to speak refrains
from so doing, and thereby leads the latter to believe in the existence of a state
of facts, in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice; " Farmers' State Bank of
Jefferson v. Jordan, 61 Okl. 15, 160 P. 53, 54.
14 - Void, Cases on Sales, 1949, Pg. 55, Note 63.
15 - Compare Keegan et al. v. Lenzie, 171 Or. 194, 135 P. 2d 717, for stricter view.
But see Mogul Transportation Co. v. Larison, 181 P. 2d 139, 1947, decided after
the Keegan case. A cash sale was intended, and the court in a dictum stated:
"Title to property does not pass until payment, and, if the buyer has taken pos-
session without paying the price, the seller, unless he has waived concurrent pay-
ment, may reclaim the property if, in the interim, rights of innocent third per-
sons have not intervened. "
16 - 149 Neb. 97, 30 N.W. 460, 1948.
17 - 108 Neb. 801, 189 N.W. 281, 1922.
possessor to hold himself out as owner, thereby being
precluded from asserting his title. But the possessor
in fact had no more than possession of the cattle, the
bill of lading, which was not negotiable, of course, in
his possession reciting the plaintiff both as consignor
and consignee. It may be, though unexpressed, that in
view of the facts that the possessor had trucked the
cattle some distance, sold them through another at a
bona fide auction, that the wiser course was to leave
the transaction closed to prevent the inconvenience,
even disruption of the flow of commerce.
As to the court's suggestion that voidable title
passed, it need only be pointed out that the first
parties contemplated a cash transaction, of which there
was no waiver.
A recent Georgia decision states the new rule in
this fashion: "Where one, under a contract of sale
(to sell?) gives to another unrestricted and unqualified
possession of personal property to deal with and use as
his own a bona fide purchaser for value from such per-
son in possession divests such owner of his title . .
" 18
The court then lessened the force of its assertion by
indicating that additionally some elements of estoppel
must intervene. Yet why indeed should estoppel inter-
vene? Particularly why should estoppel as apparent
authority or apparent ownership, or either apparent
authority or apparent ownership as doctrines differing
slightly from estoppel, be summoned to protect the
bona fide purchaser when it or they do not logically
fit the facts? A further rule is needed to give ex-
pression to a good body of decisions and surely to the
needs of stable commerce in the particular and fluid
commerce in the aggregate. Let the duty of vigilance
be cast upon the original party when pursuant to a
contract to sell he delivers possession. As to the
bona fide purchaser let the transaction be the same
as a completed sale.19
The suggestion o-f the Ward case (supra) was fol-
lowed in Blount v. Bainbridge, 20 where a directed ver-
dict of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff was
reversed. In the lower court directed verdict went
for the plaintiff on the grounds that "one cannot be a
18 - Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873, 189 S. E. 713, 1936.
19 - See 25 Col. L.R. 129 where it is suggested that the seller beware.
bona fide purchaser (sic) . . . where he takes the pro-
perty without any indicia of ownership." Here the inter-
mediate party gave a worthless check for the car, subse-
quently placed it up for sale in a garage unknown to the
seller, who was not aware that the car was being taken
for resale. In reversing the court feels somewhat in-
secure, it appears, with estoppel so grasps the "catch-
all" maxim, "that where one of two innocent persons must
suffer by the act of a third, he, by whose negligence it
happened, must be the sufferer." But the obvious result
of the decision is to allow the possessor to divest the
original owner of his title, since the original owner
'put the possession of the goods in the intermediate party
in pursuance of a contract to sell.
The question to be answered, it then appears, is
whether the doctrines of apparent authority or ownership
should be applied within their logical limits or whether
the progress of the law is in search of a new rule? The
latter would seem true, surely desirable. Let the seller
beware when he contracts to sell and delivers possession
in. pursuance thereof. The original seller means to di-
vest himself of his title upon condition after delivery
of possession, so it is no real injustice to him if the
law ignores the condition insofar as a bona fid'e pur-
chaser for value without notice is concerned. Commercial
transactions would be stabilized within this situation,
and consqnant with the economic theory that was respon-
sible for the negotiability of bills and notes, later
other documents, such stability brings about increased
commerce and thus g'reater wealth generally.
2 1
20 - 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S. E. 2d 122, 1949.
21 - See Uniform Revised Sales Act, Sec. 2-401 (1) 1949 draft, in accord generally.
